Removing the IRGC from the FTO List Risks Nothing
As we wait for the resumption of the Iran nuclear negotiations, reports indicate that the “final hurdle” is Iran’s demand for the removal of a key sanctions designation. Iranian negotiators are seeking the removal of the Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) designation placed on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), part of Iran’s armed forces. The FTO designation was imposed by the Trump administration in April 2019.
President Biden will probably lift this designation to clear the way for the mutual restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The restoration of the JCPOA would see Iran’s nuclear programme once again placed under the strictest monitoring and verification regime ever devised, ending a four-year period of growing concerns over possible Iranian proliferation. But even with the enormous security gains on offer, Republic lawmakers and other critics are suggesting that the removal of the FTO designation is an unacceptable concession to make.
The arguments being made against the removal of the FTO designation are weak. More judicious critics of the move concede that little is at stake. Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has written that the designation “was largely symbolic” and that its removal “would have few if any legal implications.” Still, he considers removing the FTO label to be a “terrible idea”—a determination that reflects how politics can trump pragmatism in American policymaking.
Levitt makes four arguments as to why Biden should not remove the FTO designation. First, he argues that Iran is treating the removal of the FTO designation as a red line because the leadership “wants something it can point to when attempting to persuade investors that it is not really involved in terrorism.” Levitt ignores the fact that the Iranian leadership has not demanded the undoing of October 2017 designation of the IRGC as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Nor has Iran insisted that its status under US law as a State Sponsor of Terror be rescinded. Iran is obviously not seeking to change the minds of foreign investors, whose decisions to engage in the Iranian market will remain predicated on significant due diligence to avoid transacting with IRGC entities, all of which will remain under sanctions. Iranian negotiators are seeking the removal of the FTO designation to demonstrate to the IRGC’s leadership that a constructive stance towards diplomacy with the United States can bear fruit. It is precisely because the imposition of the FTO designation was politically symbolic that its removal is being sought.
Second, Levitt argues that because Iran has insisted that the “nuclear negotiations must remain focused on its nuclear activities alone,” it would be a mistake to “provide relief from any terrorism-related sanctions.” Doing so would “undermine the efficacy of other non-nuclear sanctions.” But this argument is undercut by the Trump administration’s own messaging. The White House statement on the FTO designation makes clear that the move was not imposed as a discrete action to counter Iranian terrorism, but rather as a means to “significantly expand the scope and scale of our maximum pressure on the Iranian regime.” A central feature of the “maximum pressure” campaign was the “sanctions wall,” a rapid expansion in the scope of the Iran sanctions programme intended to make it more difficult for President Biden to re-enter the Iran nuclear deal.
Given that the FTO designation was symbolic and that its removal will not meaningfully change the legal status of the IRGC, the designation was clearly imposed with another goal in mind. The FTO designation was a non-nuclear sanctions measure imposed to make nuclear diplomacy more difficult. If removing the designation is necessary to secure the tremendous national security benefits of the JCPOA, then doing so is justified. In fact, failing to remove the designation would undermine the efficacy of US sanctions policy because it would prove that presidents can tie the hands of their successors in ways that make diplomacy nearly impossible to conduct.
On a related note, Levitt claims that “to protect the credibility of US sanctions authorities worldwide… the IRGC should not be removed from the FTO list until there is evidence it has ceased terrorist activities.” This is, on face, the most logical argument being made by those opposed to the removal of the FTO designation. The IRGC will almost certainly continue to engage in its “forward defence” activities, including support for proxies that the US considers terrorist groups, in the aftermath of the nuclear deal. At the same time, removing the designation would not increase the threat posed by the IRGC. Speaking to reporters last week, CENTCOM commander General Kenneth McKenzie explained that he did not expect the removal of the FTO designation on the IRGC to impact US forces. “In terms of the way we think about [the IRGC], in the terms of the way we think about the threat, and what they do on a daily basis across the theatre, I don't think much would change,” he stated.
Given that any operational impact will be limited, there are two reasons why the removal of the FTO designation is warranted absent a change in behaviour. First, the removal of the FTO designation cannot be construed as a signal that the IRGC has ceased its support for terrorism. The organisation will remain subject to wide range of sanctions, including the SDGT designation and there will be no change in messaging from the Biden administration on this point. Second, the US government also assesses that the IRGC has major influence over Iran’s national security doctrine. That the nuclear negotiations have reached this late stage clearly demonstrates that there is a consensus among Iranian policymakers, including among the ranks of the IRGC, that restoring compliance with the JCPOA is in the country’s interest. Returning to Levitt’s concern over the credibility of US sanctions, a symbolic move to recognise the IRGC’s inherent support for the successful conclusion of the Iran nuclear negotiations is sensible, especially as the Biden administration aims for future dialogue on a wider set of security concerns.
Finally, Levitt points to a “serious messaging problem” and claims that “America’s partners and allies in the region” would be dismayed if the US were to “take pressure off the [IRGC] by delisting it.” Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid have written a joint letter urging President Biden not to scrap the FTO designation. Reports claim that UAE leaders are “shocked” that the FTO designation may be removed. But these various protests appear to be part of the horse-trading by partners and allies that has long burdened Biden’s efforts to restore the nuclear deal. By seeking to impose political costs at this late stage, regional leaders are aiming to extract their own concessions from the Biden administration as part of their acquiescence to a nuclear deal that looks increasingly likely.
Even so, GCC leaders have yet to directly comment on the possibility that the FTO designation will be removed. The possibility of removal became public knowledge in the summer of last year. The GCC issued a joint statement with the United States in support of the JCPOA last November. It is highly unlikely that the GCC leaders would treat the removal of the FTO designation as a kind of red line given their interest in maintaining a regional security dialogue that includes bilateral engagement with Iran. Senior Saudi and Emirati officials have held meetings with Iranian officials, including those linked to the IRGC, over the past year. Consider also that the UAE just hosted an unrepentant Bashar al-Assad, leaving the Biden administration “troubled.” Clearly, regional leaders are ready to set optics aside when there are hard security benefits to be gained.
Given the noise about the FTO issue over the last few weeks, the Biden administration is already paying a political cost for the anticipated removal of the designation. But the administration should not lose sight of what will be gained. Removing the designation in no way changes the legal or political status of the IRGC, but it does enable the restoration of the Iran nuclear deal. For those who care about US national security, the choice is clear.
Photo: IRNA
