Iraq and Turkey Seek Cooperation Through Connectivity
Spearheaded by Iraq and Turkey, the Development Road Project (DRP) is an ambitious trade route connecting the Persian Gulf to Europe through rail, road, and port infrastructure. The project intersects with other regional connectivity efforts which aim to transform the Middle East’s from a region beset by insecurity and conflict into a hub of trade and economic opportunity. In essence, the DRP offers a vision for future regional cooperation.
Iraq and Turkey view the project as a foundation for a new partnership based on shared economic interests. Iraqi officials believe that the DRP will have "great impacts on Iraq’s bilateral relationships with its neighbours," allowing Iraq and its neighbours to develop relations "on the basis of common interests." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has heralded the project as "the new Silk Road of our region." Both governments have high hopes that the DRP open a new chapter in their bilateral relations, while also elevating their geopolitical stature as a central node connecting Asia and Europe.
Altogether, the DRP consists of three phases, set to be completed by 2028, 2033, and finally 2050. The total investment in the project is expected to be around $24 billion in the next three decades. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar have agreed to contribute financially to the project, alongside investments from the other partner countries.
The route starts at Grand Al Faw port in Iraq’s Basra, which is only now finishing its first stages of completion as it prepares to enter operation in 2028. It will follow the Euphrates River to Nasiriyah, pass through the holy Shia pilgrimage cities of Najaf and Karbala, continue to the capital Baghdad, and then proceed to Mosul. From there, it will reach the southern Turkish border city of Mersin before finally extending to Europe.
However, the project faces numerous obstacles. For Turkey, the project is contingent Iraq’s support for curtailing the PKK, a Kurdish militant group. For Iraq, the project depends on progress in disputes with Turkey over water rights. Meanwhile, Iran could act as a spoiler for the project if it sees its interests undermined.
Mutual Benefits
To bring the DRP to fruition, Iraqi and Turkish policymakers will need to learn from the failed connectivity projects of the past. A shared oil pipeline running from Kirkuk in Iraq to Ceyhan in Turkey has been shut for over a decade due to disagreements over how the two countries should share export revenues. But the stakes for cooperation may be higher now than before.
Turkey is striving for better relations with Baghdad after years of disputes over water-sharing agreements and its military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK actions mostly taken without Baghdad’s go-ahead. This is central to Ankara’s new regional strategy to expand its diplomatic footprint by offering economic and security dividends to its potential partners, in a bid to make diplomatic cooperation more attractive. Additionally, the DRP allows Turkey to position itself as a gateway for Gulf countries to access European markets. Turkey has been vocal about its exclusion from other regional connectivity schemes, especially the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which will passes through Saudi Arabia and Israel.
For Baghdad, the DRP represents a golden opportunity to diversify its oil-dependent economy—oil exports currently account for 90 percent of government revenues. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is keen to reshape Baghdad from a site of regional competition to a regional mediation hub—leveraging its 'middle position'. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly last year, Sudani expressed his desire for Iraq to be “part of the solution to any international and regional problem.” Sudani also aims to take advantage of Iraq’s strategic location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf to attract new trade and investment projects. Of course, success in these arenas would also boost his popularity ahead of the national elections to be held in 2025, should he seek a second term.
The DRP has two main selling points. First, according to one estimate, the rail route will save around two weeks compared to the Red Sea-Suez Canal route to Europe, which takes approximately 26 days from Asia—thereby reducing fuel and freight costs associated with shipping goods. Second, the project will reduce regional dependence on the Suez Canal. Since November 2023, commercial vessels travelling to the canal through the Red Sea have been targeted by Houthis forces, under the pretext of the group’s support for Palestine. Consequently, ships have been forced to take the costly detour around the Cape of Good Hope to reach European customers, adding a staggering up to 10 days to the overall shipping time.
Mismatched Expectations
For Ankara and Baghdad, the deals being negotiated alongside the DRP are arguably more important than the project itself, as they attempt to resolve long-standing disagreements. As a condition of its support for the DRP, Ankara is seeking more concessions from Baghdad regarding the PKK, which Turkey has designated as a terrorist organisation. The PKK has long maintained a presence in Iraq’s northern stronghold, allowing it to operate close to the Turkish border. Curtailing the PKK has a practical purpose as well—the group has repeatedly targeted the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and could pose a threat to DRP infrastructure.
Following his visit to Iraq on April 4, his first since 2011, Erdogan claimed to have signed a security pact with Sudani against the PKK. Erdogan emphasised that Iraq had finally recognised the PKK as a “terrorist” organisation. However, the Iraqi central government designated the group as a “banned” organisation, stopping short of labelling it a “terrorist” group. It is conceivable that Ankara made these initial claims to pressure Baghdad into adopting a full designation. A source with knowledge of the Turkish position told the author that Ankara understands and does not expect Iraq to combat the PKK in its strongholds or engage in direct confrontation. Instead, Ankara suggested that the Iraqi central government could implement alternative measures to curb the PKK’s operational abilities in Sinjar, such as increasing checkpoints in the areas and prohibiting permits for PKK offices
These more pragmatic requests contrast starkly with the reality on the ground. In April, Erdogan threatened a major offensive to clear the PKK from Iraqi Kurdistan once and for all. Following through on these threats, Ankara launched a new offensive in Iraq in May, which accelerated in June. While the offensive has been more limited than observers expected, the Iraqi Ministerial Council for National Security declared that it “rejects Turkey’s military operations within Iraq.” Although this statement is likely more for public consumption than anything else, it indicates that a prolonged incursion could build public resentment.
For its part, Iraq has focused its demands surrounding the DRP on services and water management rather than security. Baghdad has long condemned Turkish dams for reducing water levels in Euphrates and Tigris rivers—crucial for Iraqi irrigation. In a positive development, both countries signed a framework agreement to resolve the water issue during Erdogan’s visit. But ongoing meetings between bilateral working groups, formed after Erdogan's visit, have yielded little progress, making it unlikely that Baghdad will receive its fair share of water anytime soon.
Pushback from Iran
In Iraq, the DRP has also faced local opposition from Iran-backed groups who could scuttle the project—Ankara and Baghdad have done little to secure broader buy-in for the project among these groups. The new revenue streams associated with the DRP could stir-up competition among the different groups comprising the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)— an umbrella organisation comprising various military groups in Iraq, many of which are backed by Iran.
The spokesman for the Iran-backed Shia paramilitary group Kata’ib Hezbollah announced that the road “remains a concern” without specifying the reason. Kata’ib Hezbollah has demanded “guarantees” about the project from Iraqi authorities sparking fears that they could hinder the DRP’s progress. Meanwhile, an official from the parliamentary bloc representing the Iran-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq took to social media to state that the project represents a “stain in the history of Iraqi politicians.” However, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq is unlikely to act as a spoiler given its growing role within the PMF that may increase its chances of receiving substantial revenues from the DRP project.
Ultimately, Iraqi paramilitary groups might be tempted to target the DRP if they are not included or perceive their interests to be at risk. In the past, the PMF have attacked Turkey’s interests, including energy export infrastructure, in response to its military operations in Sinjar– a hotspot of competition between Ankara and Tehran.
Given Iran’s deep ties to Iraq and its significant sway over several armed groups in the country, its stance could make or break the project. The role it chooses will also depend on the fluctuating state of Iran-Turkey relations. Iran has shown wariness about connectivity projects that could rival its own aspirations to become the primary hub for transit routes, particularly with the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Tehran’s support for the DRP is therefore conditional on its involvement. Specifically, Iran aims to complete its first railway link with Basra soon. If this railway connects to the DRP—a possibility Iran is pursuing—it would enhance trade with both Iraq and Turkey. This point was made clear during a meeting in June between Iranian Acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Sudani, where Iran expressed its willingness to "contribute" to the project.
Looking Ahead
Importantly, the Iraqi government has yet to conduct a comprehensive feasibility study to assess the mega project's viability. Turkey and Iraq seem comfortable with the delay, viewing it as a confidence-building measure that could eventually lead to greater economic consolidation. However, the real challenge lies ahead: addressing the longstanding issues that have strained Iraq-Turkey relations for years, rather than skirting around them with vague promises that will only resurface later and derail the project. In the absence of security-focused negotiations to address these issues, they risk becoming bigger obstacles to the DRP’s success.
Much of the diplomatic burden unfairly falls on Iraq to rally support among the different armed groups and governorate-level political groups—who may act as spoilers if their interests are not met. Baghdad should engage seriously with groups likely to feel excluded, while both countries should adopt a multi-pronged diplomatic approach to secure regional buy-in.
Before this can happen, both nations urgently need to flesh out the funding details and conduct a feasibility study to align expectations among the many stakeholders. Ultimately, in a region where infrastructure projects too often get caught in the crossfire—and considering the unpredictable nature of the Iraqi political sphere—this venture requires a more proactive approach to succeed. Political will alone is not enough.’
Photo: AK Party
