European Union leaders have agreed on a landmark embargo of Russian oil that will seek to slash imports by 90 percent by the end of the year. That is bad news for Iran.
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European Union leaders have agreed on a landmark embargo of Russian oil that will seek to slash imports by 90 percent by the end of the year. That is bad news for Iran.
A new round of protests has begun in Iran. People are taking to the streets following a controversial subsidy cut perceived as an increase in the price of bread.
SIPRI produces the world’s most authoritative data on global military expenditure and the arms trade. But for years they have been overstating the size of Iran’s military budget.
Significant attention has been paid to the impact of the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s economic contraction on Uzbekistan. But Uzbekistan’s exposure to the crisis does not just stem from the contraction of remittances coming from Russia.
Qatar’s transport minister made a two-day trip to Iran’s Kish Island, during which officials and businesspersons from both countries explored possible teamwork as Qatar prepares to host the 2022 World Cup.
For both policymakers applying sanctions and those seeking to resist sanctions, better policy outcomes require supply-side thinking.
Reports indicate that the “final hurdle” facing the Iran nuclear negotiations is Iran’s demand for the removal of the Foreign Terrorist Organisation designation placed on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, part of Iran’s armed forces.
Comparing the economies of Russia and Iran, it is reasonable to assume that Russia will endure its financial war.
The unfolding crisis in Ukraine offers the latest evidence of Putin’s irredentist obsessions and the ways in which those obsessions threaten the political and economic integrity of Russia’s neighbours.
Most of the questions around the JCPOA’s economic prospects revolve around whether European companies will bother to engage in the Iranian market given the challenging experience of the last few years. But there is another trade relationship that arguably matters more.
The sanctions relief afforded to Iran in January 2016 as part of the implementation of the JCPOA did not lead to a cascade—while a significant number of foreign companies did commence or resume operations in Iran, no larger, second cohort followed.
The choice we face as those working on Iran policy is not about choosing between Plan A or Plan B—it is much bigger than that.
Iran’s Arab neighbours have acknowledged that they can benefit from JCPOA-related sanctions relief, suggesting that regional diplomacy underway has reinforced trust in the nuclear talks.
Sanctions relief will enable Iran to buy the industrial goods that will undergird the country’s economic resilience for the next two decades.
Iran’s new president, Ebrahim Raisi, has spent his first 100 days in office touring the country in order to meet with communities and to hear their grievances.
If Iranian leaders are concerned that the “economic war” might resume if Trump returns to office 2024, they ought to remember that they are in an economic war right now. The restoration of the JCPOA represents an opportunity for a useful ceasefire.
Leaders in the United Arab Emirates are eyeing an economic windfall should the Biden administration succeed in its effort to return to Iran nuclear deal. But they have not waited for the lifting of sanctions to begin earning billions from Iran.
